ABSTRACT
Introduction
In the supply chain system, there exists the conflict between the local interests of the supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain, which leads to the system inefficiency. At present, one of the most important research areas of supply chain is to design the suitable coordination mechanism in order to obtain the global optimization of the supply chain performance. In this process, the information plays a very important position. As the supply chain members tend to hide their private information to maintain information superiority, this will lead to "Adverse Select" and "Moral Hazard" in various fields [1] .
In the recent decade, scholars have studied on the issue of the supply chain coordination from various angles. These studies can be roughly divided into two categories. One is to resolve the "double marginalization" problem by contract design in the situation of the full information [2] [3] [4] . Such contracts do not involve the information incentive. The other is to study the supply chain incentive problem in the situation of the asymmetric information. Corbett etc. studied that the optimal quantity discounts incentive contract between the supplier and the retailer [5] . Basu etc. studied the incentive issues of the sales force under asymmetric information based on agency theory [6] . Lal etc. [7, 8] and Chen [9] extended the above studies. Many Chinese academics are also carried out research on this issue [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . For the supply chain coordination, the author's research team had a systemic research on the issue earlier. Some relevant research results have been published [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . This paper is the important one of the systemic study. In the simple principal-agent model, the agent is engaged in one job and the agent's effort is one-dimensional. However in many cases of the real life, agents are engaged in the job of more than one. Or, even if there is only one job, it involves more than one dimension. Furthermore, it exits conflict in the distribution of the same agent's energy between the different jobs. To deal with this problem, we construct the dynamic multi-task supply chain principal-agent model, by which we analyze the impact of the information asymmetry to the supply chain contract. Furthermore, by comparing the contracts between the single-term multi-task and two-term multi-task, we analyzed their different effect on the commission rate.
Assumptions and Parameters Set
We make the following assumptions for the tractable analysis. Considering a Stackelberg model between a supplier S who is the principal and a retailer R who is the agent, the supplier offers the retailer products to sale and pays the retailer according to sales outcome which is affected by the retailer's effort and the random factors. Set is the retailer's expected profit whose ownership belongs to the supplier.
denotes the retailer's effort for the short sales goal.
denotes the retailer's effort for the long sales goal.
denotes the cost of the retailer's effort, satisfying 
, For the sake of simplifying the calculating, assume that x reflects . The ownership of the sales profits belongs to the supplier, and the supplier offers the linear salary to pay the retailer.
where ( ) s x is the wage paid to the retailer if the total sales outcome is x .  denotes the one-off wealth transfer which doesn't affect the incentive intension （ Called Salary） ;
which denotes the incentive intension（Called Commission Rate）, that means if x increase by one unit , the wage of the retailer increased by  unit.
The Single-Stage Multi-Task Model
In the single-stage model, the supplier offers a one-time wage schedule, ( ) s x , according to which the retailer is rewarded. Assume the supplier is risk-neural, the expected utility function is as follows: 
To make the analysis simple, we use the certainty equivalent (CE) instead of the expected utility of the retailer [18] .
where is the expected wage,
is the income variance, is the risk cost. is the covariance matrix
The supplier is the leader in the Stackelberg model, who has first-step advantage in the game. However, when he/she pursuits the profit maximization, he/she must consider the incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint. Thus, the principal-agent model between the supplier and the retailer can be rewritten as the following optimization programming. 
where (6) is participation constraint (IR), and (7) is incentive compatibility constraint (IC).
The Full Information Benchmark
In this section, let's begin with the full information case where the retailer's effort is observable and verifiable. Then the supplier can assign an effort level to the retailer by designing a forcing contact. Under this condition, the incentive compatibility (7) is invalid and we only consider the participation constraint (6), which is binding. Namely, can be rewritten as follows:
The Asymmetric Information Case
Solving , we can obtain that: ( ) P Generally, the supplier can't observe the retailer's action , and only can observe outcome a x . In this case, the incentive compatibility constraint (7) is valid. Substituting (7) by the first-order condition, we can obtain the equivalent programming. i.e. (7) is equal to that 1  2  1  2  1  1  1   1  2  2  2  2   1   2   , ) , (9) is the class condition of the Pareto optimality: the expected marginal profit of the effort is equal to the expected marginal cost. That is similar to the single-task case. We have the following conclusion.
Solving the model ( ) P Proposition 1：Under the condition of full information, by designing the linear incentive contract, the game between the supplier and the retailer can achieve the Pareto optimality when the retailer has multi-dimensional effort. 
Substituting by (10), we get
Solve the first order derivative of (13), (14) about 1  ,
Solving the above equation, we obtain that
Similarly, we get
By (13), (14), we get the following conclusion. 
Two-Stage Multi-Task Game Model
In the two-stage multi-task model, suppose the retailer's effort for the long task in the first stage will affect the profit in the second stage of the supply chain. Set denotes the expected effort profit of the first stage of the retailer ， denotes the expected profit of the second stage. Where and denote the effort for the short task and long task respectively. Because the effort in the first stage will affect the profit in the second stage, it will be the variable of the output function of the second stage. The ownership of and belongs to the supplier, the supplier offers the wage schedule according to the two-stage outcome. Similarly to the assumption of onestage, the observed outcome in the second stage is that , the random variable in the first stage. The supplier offers the two-stage payoff contract according the observed outcome as follows. 
The supplier's expected utility is that:
Now, the certainty equivalent of the retailer in the first stage and the second stage is that 
Considering the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, the supplier need solve the following programming: 
 by derivate (23) about 1  and get 
, it is evident . Thus, we have the following conclusion.
B>A
Proposition 3: By designing dynamic multi-task contract, the supplier can inspire the retailer to pay more effort for the long-term goal without the premise of changing the retailer's effort for the short goal. It shows that the dynamic contract design is conducive to maintain the long-term supply chain partnership.
Conclusions
The supply chain contract design is the important means of the supply chain coordination. For different environment, it will greatly improve the level of supply chain collaboration by the design of appropriate contract. In this paper, we have studied the incentive contract between the supplier and the retailer. Because of asymmetrical information, the supplier can't observe the effort level of the retailer. Therefore, the supplier can only inspire the retailer's different effort level by the incentive mechanisms design. The major study of the paper is on how to design the dynamic incentive contract to stimulate retailers to pay more efforts for the long-term under asymmetric information and multi-task environment, which has the guiding role for establishing the supply chain dynamic alliance. At the same time, our study extends the existing research results of the principal-agent. In our research work, for the sake of simplifying the technical analysis and the calculating, we focused on the second-term multi-task game. In the future, we will extend our research to multi-term multi-task model, which would be challenging and meaningful.
